The Demand for International Regimes- Robert O. Keohane (1982)
The paper addresses the question as to why self-interested actors establish international regimes through mutual agreement
International
regimes are like contracts that facilitate the making of agreements among actors
(states) with long-term objectives by providing rules, norms principles, and
procedures that help actors overcome barriers to agreements and realize their
interests collectively.
Since
actors operate in a self-help system, the rules of international regimes lack
binding authority. The facilitation of agreements between actors is to prevent
a “war of all against all”.
Public
goods give rise to the demand for international regimes which can improve
problems of transactions costs and information imperfections that obstruct
effective decentralized responses to problems of providing public goods.
Increased
issue concentration will lead to increased demand for international regimes
The
demand for international regimes will be a function of the effectiveness of the
regimes in developing standard generalized commitments and providing
high-quality information to policymakers
We
can better understand trans-governmental relations and the lags observed between
structural change and regime change
Past
patterns of institutionalized cooperation may be able to compensate for
increasing fragmentation of power; hegemony is not necessarily a precondition
for stable international regimes under all circumstances
Determining
the difference between control-oriented international regimes and insurance
regimes may help us understand emerging adaptations of advanced industrialized
countries to a global situation where their capacity for control over events is
much less than it was during the postwar quarter century.
International
regimes do not necessarily increase levels of welfare; there will always be the
possibility of conflict
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